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1.  
 Burger and Kass argue that doctors should avoid ordering screening tests in most cases 
where there are no professional guidelines or where guidelines discourage the use of the test 
(class D recommendation) (Burger and Kass, in press).  Examples of unproven screening tests 
include whole-body CT scanning in healthy individuals and brain MRAs in patients with a 
family history of aneurysms.  Burger and Kass claim that it is unethical to order such tests partly 
since patients requesting them may be unaware of the risks and the uncertainties about them 
(p.17).  Ordering such a test also diverts healthcare resources from more effective uses, increases 
the chance that the test will become “standard of care,” and undermines the ability of researchers 
to recruit subjects for randomized studies of it (p. 21).  Even if the risk of the test is small, false 
positives or incidental findings can lead to more risky and expensive tests and treatments, which 
again may cause no benefit and even net harm.  For all these reasons, the authors take a firm 
position against the use of unproven screening tests (under “Case 1” and “Case 2”) (Burger and 
Kass, in press).  
 The most serious challenge to Burger and Kass’s position involves the possibility of a 
patient who fully understands the possible risks and unclear benefits, is willing to shoulder the 
expense personally, and greatly values the reassurance that a negative test could provide.  The 
authors acknowledge that there could be such a case, involving a test with minimal supporting 
evidence, where the “physician actually believes the benefits of screening could outweigh the 
harms for a particular patient” (p. 19).  But even then, they argue, the physician should resist the 
patient’s entreaties (p. 19). 
 They state the crux of their argument as follows:  “The primary goal of medicine, 
including the administration of medical services, is to benefit patients’ health.  As such, patients 
should not have free access to any medical test or treatment they desire and can pay for, as they 
would for other types of goods and services.  Indeed, physicians should actively protect them 
from medical products of poorly quantified risks and benefits.” (p. 19)  The key principle here 
appears to be that the doctor should only offer interventions that she believes will (or may) have 
a net benefit for the patient’s health, and should refuse to offer services that she believes will 
offer only reassurance or solace, not improved health.   
This principle has been more typically used in discussions of decisions regarding 
treatment, rather than testing.  For example, a doctor may ethically refuse to provide a 
medication or procedure that she believes will not benefit the patient, no matter how much the 
patient desires the treatment and understands the issues.  But there can be significant questions 
about this principle, especially if the treatment has low risk and could have very positive 
psychological effects.  Solace, after all, is a reasonable goal of healthcare as well as health, as 
has been accepted in palliative care and pain management.   
The principle is even more problematic when considering tests rather than treatments.  
Although tests must be evaluated primarily based on their ability to improve outcomes, the 
information provided by testing may be valuable in itself, for example when it carries prognostic 
implications.  Knowledge may be pursued independent of any practical import in other areas as 
well, such as basic science.  The key dangers of unproven tests are their consumption of precious 
healthcare resources and tendency to lead to other unbeneficial, high-risk, and high-cost tests and 
treatments (Redberg and Walsh 2008).  That said, it may be only fair to allow patients to choose 
to undergo low-risk tests that they can pay for themselves, as long as they understand the facts 
and want the information.  The proper stopping point may be after the initial testing, before 
embarking on further, higher-risk tests or treatments. 
 
2.  
 The recent introduction of “personal-genomics” screens in clinical care provides an 
important setting in which to apply and extend Burger and Kass’s arguments.  Multiple 
companies now offer tests that survey an individual’s genome to identify single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) and then provide information – often very tentative – about associated 
characteristics and medical risks.  The company 23andme provides customers with information 
on 96 topics, ranging from their risk for diabetes, heart disease, and multiple cancers to their type 
of earwax and sensitivity to bitter taste (https://www.23andme.com/).  Other companies, such as 
Navigenics (http://www.navigenics.com/) and deCODEme (http://www.decodeme.com/) focus 
more specifically on medical risks (Fox 2008, Salkin 2008). 
The information provided by such companies is based on studies – of more or less 
validity and reliability – of associations between specific SNPs and individuals’ risks and 
characteristics (Fox 2008).  Such genetic information is necessarily partial even if it is valid:  a 
patient with below-average genetic risk of lung cancer may well have higher-than-average 
overall risk, due to a heavy smoking history. There is basically no evidence at present that these 
sort of genetic tests contribute to health or improve healthcare.  And, like the tests that Burger 
and Kass discuss, there is also the significant possibility of harm:  imagine that the patient who 
hears that he has below average risk for lung cancer decides that he should not bother quitting 
smoking.  The tests do not fit the definition of “screening” that Burger and Kass adopt – since 
the goal is to determine risk, not to detect “preclinical disease” (Morrison 1992, quoted in Burger 
and Kass, p. 9) – but their arguments suggest that doctors should resist patients’ requests for 
personal-genomic analyses.   
This recommendation must again confront the possibility of a well-informed patient who 
wants the information and is willing to pay out-of-pocket for the test.  While medicine’s goal is 
to treat the sick and support health, genetic testing can satisfy other reasonable human needs, 
such as a desire to know.  By mixing in data about risk for baldness, muscle performance, and 
ancestry, 23andme blurs the line between personal and medical information, and thus enhances 
the argument that it is unjust to withhold the test from all individuals until it is proven useful in 
medical care.   
Taking this reasoning to its logical conclusion, 23andme and Navigenics now offer their 
testing directly to consumers, accomplishing an end-run around medical authority.  Anybody 
who is willing to pay $399 to 23andme, for instance, can fill up a test-tube with his saliva and get 
the full report (Fox 2008, Salkin 2008).  This comes with access to a website that provides lay 
explanations of the information and various other features, such as an opportunity for social 
networking among people with similar genetic traits.  For pioneering the “retail DNA test,” 
23andme won Time magazine’s Invention of the Year award in 2008 (Hamilton 2008). 
Although such direct-to-consumer testing is limited in some states (Fox 2008), the 
availability of these tests in many places shifts the question from whether doctors should order 
the tests to how to respond to them and how to regulate them. At least part of the regulatory 
model should focus on making sure that consumers are adequately informed before and after 
they choose to be tested.  Providing such information beforehand certainly serves the goal of 
informed consent and may convince many not to purchase personal genomic testing.  Burger and 
Kass propose similar rules for informed consent before unproven screening tests that have at 
least some evidence of benefit (under Case 3).   
Information and education is also key to managing the impact of the tests.  A patient who 
hears that he has “below average” risk of heart disease must also hear that healthy behaviors are 
still important for him.  A patient who learns that he has a slightly elevated risk of prostate 
cancer should also learn that there is no evidence supporting earlier or more frequent screening 
for him, and that such testing can lead to invasive and risky testing and treatment.  In addition, a 
patient who wants to pursue unusual screening or treatment should be expected to bear the 
expense himself.   
Healthcare professionals as well need to be provided with clear, evidence-supported 
guidelines for how to respond to genetic screens.  A doctor who is unsure how to treat a patient 
with a slightly increased chance of heart disease or cancer, for instance, may well respond by 
over-testing and over-treating.  Even if a doctor believes that no response is needed, he may feel 
motivated to act due to fear of a possible lawsuit if he turns down the patient’s request and the 
patient later develops the disease.  Doctors will only be able to resist such pressure if there are 
clear and easily accessed guidelines. 
 
Personal genomic screening, especially when marketed direct-to-consumers, thus 
threatens to worsen the inefficient use of healthcare resources that Burger and Kass discuss in the 
case of unproven screening tests.  The information that genomic and other screening tests can 
provide may well have value for many patients, but its effective use in healthcare depends on 
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